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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Whether the Public Service Commission failed to properly
consider each of the factors mandated by the Legislature in
Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-3(2), in reaching its decision to
detariff rate levels for mobile telephone service.

II.

Whether the Public Service Commission erred by basing findings of fact solely on the testimony of Mr. James H. Murphy
which lacked any proper foundation and included speculation
and hearsay.

III. Whether findings of fact Nos. 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14,
15 and 16 are unsupported by the record and are erroneous as
a matter of law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is taken from a decision of the Utah Public
Service Commission issued on April 17, 1987 granting in part, and
denying

in part, a petition by Mountain Bell seeking partial

deregulation of mobile and rural radio services under Utah Code
Ann. S 54-8b-l et seq.

The Commission by its Report and Order

detariffed mobile radio service and exempted the suppliers of
such services from the requirement of seeking prior approval for
rate changes.

It denied, however, similar requests regarding

rural radio service.

Petitioner herein filed a Petition for

Review and Rehearing which was deemed denied due to Commission

-1-

inaction.

The matter

is now before

the Court pursuant

to

Industrial's Petition for Review filed on June 23, 1987.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On August 9f 1985, The Mountain States Telephone and
Telegraph Company (Mountain Bell) filed a petition with the Utah
Public Service Commission

(the "Commission") seeking an order

exempting it completely from regulation with regard to mobile
radio service and rural radio service.

The petition was filed

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §S 54-8b-l £t sea, and was assigned
Case No. 85-049-09.

In support of its petition, Mountain Bell

prefiled the direct testimony and exhibits of James H. Murphy at
the time the petition was filed.
On August

19, 1985, NewVector

("NewVector") filed a Motion to Intervene.2

Communications, Inc.
On August 20, 1985,

David R. Williams d/b/a Industrial Communications ("Industrial")
filed a Notice of Intervention and Protest.

On August 23, 1985,

1
In its Petition to the Commission, Mountain Bell defines
mobile radio service as " . . . a communication service furnished
through a mobile telephone service base station between a wire
line telephone and a mobile telephone unit or between two mobile
units." Rural radio service is defined as " . . . a communication service furnished through a mobile telephone base station or
central office station between a rural customer station and a
wire line telephone, between a rural customer station and a
mobile unit, or between two rural customer stations."
(R. at
465-66).
2 NewVector later changed its name to U.S. West NewVector Group,
Inc.
-2-

Mobile Telephone, Inc. ("Mobile") filed a Notice of Intervention
3
and Protest.
On January 9, 1986, Mountain Bell and the Utah Division
of Public Utilities (the "Division") filed a joint motion for a
continuance on the ground that Mountain Bell had not

completed

development and implementation of an accounting system to separate regulated services from unregulated services.

(R. at 673.)

The hearing date which had previously been set for March 4, 1986
was

vacated

and

August 5, 1986.

a

further

Prehearing

Conference

was

set

for

(R. at 685.)

At the Prehearing Conference on August 5, 1986, Mountain Bell indicated that, in light of the fact that its accounting system still had not been fully implemented, it was changing
its request for relief

in this matter from full exemption from

all regulation by the Commission to a request that the Commission
detariff the rate levels for fixed rural and mobile radio services.

(R. at 692-93.)

The Commission concluded that Mountain

Bell did not need to file a new petition since the detariffing of
rate levels was contemplated by the original petition.
693.)

(R. at

A Commission hearing was scheduled, for November, 1986.
In a Prehearing Conference in September, 1985, the Com-

mission concluded that Mountain Bell's petition should be treated
as

3

a generic

proceeding

to

consider

the

effects

Mobile was later acquired by Daniels & Associates.
-3-

of

possible

deregulation on other related companies.

The Commission there-

fore assigned the petition a generic docket number, Case No.
85-999-19, and ordered that all other providers of rural and
mobile radio services in Utah be notified of the proceeding.

(R.

at 487.)
Hearings in the consolidated proceedings were held by
the Commission on November 13 and 14, 1986 and on January 20,
1987.

Mountain Bell presented only one direct witness in support

of its petition, Mr. James H. Murphy.

Over repeated objections

and motions to strike made by Industrial's counsel, the Commission entertained the testimony and exhibits of Mr. Murphy.
at 21, 58, 61-3, 94, 117.)

(R.

In commenting on the "hearsay" aspect

of Mr. Murphy's testimony, Commissioner Cameron stated:

"Hearsay

evidence is admissible in Utah administrative hearings.

It can-

not be relied on solely for findings of fact or conclusion by the
Commission."

(R. at 29-30.)

Division witnesses Mr. Robert

Capshaw and Dr. George R. Compton admitted before the Commission
that their testimony was based in part on the testimony of Mr.
Murphy.

(R. at 160, 187-88.)

Mr. Murphy admitted that his tes-

timony and exhibits contained facts obtained from a third party
source, about which he had no personal knowledge.

(R. at 51-53.)

Final arguments were heard by the Commission on January 20, 1987.
On April 17, 1987, the Commission issued its Report and
Order in consolidated cases 87-049-09 and 85-999-19.
of the Commission stated:
-4-

The Order

1.
Effective immediately, regulated suppliers of mobile telephone service in the following cities and surrounding areas, may
remove rate levels from their tariffs:
Moab
Ogden
Provo
Vernal

Monticello
Salt Lake City
Price

Such suppliers need not seek prior approval
of changes in rates for mobile telephone
service.
2.
Rate levels for rural radio service
shall continue to be tariffed and subject to
all regulatory requirements of Title 54.
(R. at 582-83.) (A copy of the Report and Order is attached
hereto as Appendix "A".)

Industrial filed

its Petition for

Review and Rehearing with the Commission on May 5, 1987.
537.)

(R. at

(A copy of the Petition for Review and Rehearing

attached hereto as Appendix "B".)

is

The Commission took no action

concerning the Petition for Review and Rehearing during the time
period specified in Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-15, and so it is deemed
denied.

Industrial filed its Petition for Review with this Court

on June 23, 1987.

(R. at 561.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Commission concluded in its Report and Order dated
April 17, 1987, that it was not required to consider each of the
factors (a) through (k) as set forth by the Legislature in Utah
Code Ann. S 54-8b-3(2).

In fact, during the hearings before the

Commission, no competent evidence whatsoever was introduced by
Mountain Bell or any other party with regard to some of the
-5-

factors enumerated by the Legislature in S 54-8b-3(2).
ings of Fact

upon which

the Commission

based

The Find-

its decision

to

detariff rate levels of mobile telephone service providers in the
seven cities listed in the Commission's Order were based solely
upon hearsay evidence and upon unsubstantiated conclusions drawn
by

witnesses

and

by

the

Commission

itself.

As

such

the

Commission's Findings of Fact were inadequate as a matter of law,
and the Commission's Order is invalid under the requirements of
the statute.
In the hearings held by the Commission on this matter
on November 13 and 14, 1986 and on January 20, 1987, the Commission allowed Mountain Bell to present prefiled and direct testimony of Mr. James H. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy's testimony was admit-

tedly based upon facts of which he had no personal knowledge and
as to which he was

incompetent

to testify.

Over petitioner's

repeated objections and motions to strike, the Commission heard
and considered Mr. Murphy's testimony despite its lack of foundation and despite the fact that it was clearly hearsay.

The Com-

mission then relied solely upon Mr. Murphy's hearsay testimony in
making

Findings

of

Fact

upon

which

it based

its decision

to

detariff mobile radio service rate levels.
In addition, the testimony presented by Division witnesses, Robert Capshaw and George R. Compton, contained hearsay,
was without foundation, and was based at least in part upon the
incompetent hearsay testimony of Mr. Murphy.
-6-

As a result, the

Commission's ultimate Findings of Fact and decision to allow
mobile telephone service providers to remove rate levels from
their tariffs were based solely upon incompetent, hearsay testimony and are invalid as a matter of law.
Finally, several of the Commission's Finding of Facts
were either based on incompetent evidence or are wholly devoid of
any support in the record.

Because these facts are unsupported

by the record, they are erroneous as a matter of law.

Thus the

Commission's Report and Order based upon these unsupported findings and conclusions is invalid.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE COMMISSION'S REPORT AND ORDER IS INVALID
BECAUSE THE COMMISSION FAILED TO FOLLOW THE
PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED BY THE LEGISLATURE FOR
PARTIALLY OR WHOLLY EXEMPTING PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATION SERVICE PROVIDERS FROM REGULATION.
A.

The Commission Failed to Consider and Make Find-

ings of Fact Regarding Relevant Factors Mandated by the Legislature for Consideration in S 54-8b-3(2).
In 1985 the Utah Legislature passed Utah Code Ann.
§ 54-8b-3, which gives the Commission jurisdiction and power to
partially or wholly exempt any telecommunications corporation or
public telecommunication services from any requirement of Title
54.

Section 54-8b-3 states in relevant part:
(1) The commission is vested with power and
jurisdiction to partially or wholly exempt
from any requirement of this title any
-7-

telecommunications
corporation
or
public
telecommunications service in this state.
(2) The commission, on its own initiative or
in response to an application by a telecommunications corporation or a user of a public
telecommunications service, mayf after public
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, make
findings and issue an order specifying its
requirements, terms, and conditions exempting
any telecommunications corporation or any
public telecommunications service from any
requirement of this title either for a specific geographic area or in the entire state
if the commission finds that the telecommunications corporation or service is subject to
effective competition, that customers of the
telecommunications
corporation
or service
have reasonably available alternatives, and
that the telecommunications corporation or
service does not serve a captive customer
base, and if such exemption is in the public
interest of the citizens of the state.
In
determining whether to exempt any telecommunications corporation or public telecommunications service from any requirement of this
title, the commission shall consider all relevant factors including, but not limited to;
(a) the number of other providers offering
similar services; (b) the intrastate market
power and market share within the state of
Utah of the telecommunications corporation
requesting an exemption; (c) the intrastate
market power and market share of other providers; (d) the existence of other providers
to make
functionally equivalent
services
readily
available
at
competitive
rates,
terms, and conditions; (e) the effect of
exemption on the regulated revenue requirements of the telecommunications corporation
requesting an exemption; (f) the ease of
entry of other providers into the marketplace; (g) the overall impact of exemption on
the public interest; (h) the integrity of all
service providers in the proposed market;
(i) the cost of providing such service;
(j) the economic impact on existing telecommunications corporations; and (k) whether
competition will promote the provision of

-8-

adequate
rates,

services

at

just

and

reasonable

Utah Code Ann. S 54-8b-3 (1985) (emphasis added).
The language of Section 54-8b-3 makes it clear that the
Legislature, in enacting the statute, did not intend to vest the
Commission

with

unrestricted

authority

to partially

or

wholly

exempt public telecommunication services from the requirements of
Title 54.
when

Rather, its intent was to establish a procedure which,

correctly

followed,

would

allow

the Commission

to

grant

Commission

competent

exemptions under certain circumstances.
In

the

hearings

before

the

no

evidence was introduced either by Mountain Bell or by the Division regarding a number of the factors that "shall" be considered
under Subsection
the

Commission

Legislature

(2)(a) through
has

and

ignored

its Report

(k) of S 54-8b-3.

the

procedure

and Order

As a result

established

by

the

issued April 17, 1987 is

invalid.
For

example,

"relevant

factor"

(i),

"the

cost

of

providing such service," is critical in this case because Mountain

Bell's

Petition

seeks

pricing of its services.

removal

of

rate

levels

from

the

However, despite the fact that Mountain

Bell's witness had available cost studies which he could have
presented

to the Commission,

the Commission

refused to require

production of such evidence, finding instead that this particular
factor was not relevant in this case.

-9-

The Commission concluded,

"while costs may be a relevant factor in our ongoing oversight
role, we do

not

believe

it

is necessary

or

relevant

that

we

review specific cost data to determine whether exemption should
be allowed. . . ."
that

of

the

(R. at 531.)

Legislature

in

By substituting its wisdom for

this

manner,

the

Commission

was

clearly acting beyond the scope of its authority and in direct
contravention of statutory requirements.
B.

The Commission Improperly Interpreted the Language

of S 54-8b-3(2).
In its Report and Order

in this case, the Commission

correctly pointed out that Section 54-8b-3(2):
. . .sets forth four findings that the Commission must make to support an exemption
from regulation for a service:
1.
The service
effective competition;

is

subject

to

2.
Customers of the service have
reasonably available alternatives;
3.
The service does not serve a
captive customer base; and
4.
Exemption
interest.
(R. at 569.)

is

in

the

public

However, the Report goes on to state:

These are the only four issues upon which the
Commission must make explicit findings. . . .
By expressly requiring findings as to the
four, but merely indicating that the others
shall be considered, the Legislature is indicating its intent that the latter are to
serve as a general guide of relevant questions to examine but is not necessarily indicating that all the criteria are necessarily
relevant in a given case.
Indeed, the
-10-

statute indicates that other criteria in a
given case may be relevant.
One thing is
completely clear:
the Legislature is not
requiring separate findings as to each of the
factors.
(R. at 571.)
The position taken by the Commission is in direct opposition to the plain language of the statute.

The statute reads,

"In determining whether to exempt any telecommunications corporation or public telecommunication service from any requirement of
this title, the Commission shall consider all relevant

factors

including but not limited to" those factors set forth in subparagraphs

(a)-(k).

Utah Code Ann. § 54-8b-3(2) (emphasis

added).

Although the Commission is not required to make specific findings
of fact as to "all relevant factors" including those designated
in subparagraphs

(a)-(k), it "shall" consider them.

Id.

As a

matter of law, it cannot and did not consider them when no evidence was submitted with

respect

to those matters.

As

noted

above, Mountain Bell admitted that it had in its possession its
"cost of providing such service" —
same.

(R. at 97-100.)

yet it failed to produce the

Even worse, the Mountain Bell witness

refused to disclose this information on cross-examination and the
Commission

refused,

on appropriate

request,

answer questions eliciting those very facts.
Rather
Legislature

than

follow

the procedure

to require him

to

(R. at 97-100.)
established

by

the

in S54-8b-3, the Commission concluded that " . . .

examination of the additional factors demonstrates that it would
-11-

be virtually impossible to reduce some of them to factual testimony or to precise factual conclusions. . . •

Thus, while the

Commission needs to bear these factors in mind, there is no legal
requirement to make explicit factual findings as to each."
at 572.)

(R.

This blanket dismissal of the Legislative requirement

that the Commission consider all of the relevant factors listed
in §54-8b-3(2)(a)-(k) directly contradicts the plain language of
the statute, and by so acting, the Commission has exceeded its
authority and its Order in this case is invalid.
In Mountain

States Legal Foundation v. Utah Public

Service Commission, 636 P.2d 1047 (Utah 1981), this Court, in
striking down a "senior citizen rate" approved by the Commission
for establishing electric utility fees, stated the following:
[l]f the Commission has not acted within the
powers delegated to it by the Legislature, or
there is no legal basis in fact for the findings of the Commission, or the findings do
not rationally support proper legal conclusions, an order is contrary to law and must
be set aside. Commission expertise alone is
not an adequate basis upon which ultimate
findings as to reasonableness of rates and
classifications of customers may be based.
It is, therefore, the responsibility of
this Court to determine whether the Commission acted outside its jurisdiction, in
excess of its lawful powers, or in a manner
which is arbitrary and capricious and therefore without legal justification. (Citations
omitted.)
Id. at 1051.

-12-

In

the

case

at

bar,

the

Commission

has

adopted

an

interpretation of S 54-8b-3 which is contrary to the plain language of that statute.

The Commission has therefore acted "in

excess of its lawful powers, . . .

in a manner which is arbitrary

and capricious and therefore without legal justification."
In West Jordan v. Department
P.2d 411

of Employment

(Utah 1982), a case involving

Id.

Sec,

656

an appeal taken to the

State Industrial Commission regarding the right of a terminated
employee

to

receive

unemployment

compensation

benefits,

this

Court held that "agency decisions are still subject to judicial
review and will be reversed when they are inconsistent with the
governing
412.

legislation or the decisions of this Court."

Under the facts of the present

Id.

at

case, the Commission has

clearly acted in a manner inconsistent with the language of S 548b-3, and its Order should be invalidated.
C.
Failed

Mountain Bell Failed to Offer, and the Commission

to Require

Information Regarding

the Factors Listed

in

$ 54-8b-3(2)(a) through (k) Even When Such Information Was Admittedly In Mountain Bell's Possession.
On

cross-examination

before

Bell's witness, Mr. Murphy, admitted
revenue/cost
declined
tary."

the Commission,

Mountain

that he was aware of the

relationship of Mountain Bell's radio services but

to produce

that

(R. at 97-100.)

information

because

it was

"proprie-

Despite the Legislature's instruction in

S54-8b-3(2) (i) that the Commission
-13-

is to consider "the cost of

providing such service," the Commission
Mountain

Bell

refused

Bell's costs.
exemplifies
§54-8b-3.
evant

to present

(R. at 100-102.)
its

failed to require, and

testimony

regarding

Mountain

This action by the Commission

unwillingness

to

follow

the

procedure

of

By failing to require evidence on this and other "rel-

factors,"

the

Commission

ignored

the

Legislature's

requirements.
II.
THE COMMISSION'S REPORT AND ORDER WAS BASED
SOLELY UPON HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND INCOMPETENT
EVIDENCE.
A.

The Testimony and Exhibits Offered in Support of

Mountain Bell's Petition by Mr. Murphy Were Based Upon Hearsay
and Facts of Which He Had No Personal Knowledge.
In Lakeshore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 339
P.2d 1011, 1014 (Utah 1959), this Court held that hearsay testimony is admissible in proceedings before the Public Service Commission.

However, in so holding this Court also stated that "a

finding of fact cannot be based solely on hearsay evidence, but
it must be 'supported by a residuum of legal evidence competent
in

a

court

of

law.'"

Id.

See

also,

Sandy

State

Bank

v.

Brimhall, 636 P.2d 481, 486 (Utah 1981) (in a hearing before a
Utah Bank Commissioner hearsay evidence was admissible, however,
finding of fact could not be based solely upon hearsay evidence
unless the finding was supported "by a residuum of legal evidence
competent in a court of law."); Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control
-14-

Commission, 681 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984) ("hearsay evidence is
admissible

in proceedings before administrative agencies.

ever, findings of
evidence.

How-

fact cannot be based exclusively on hearsay

They must be supported by a residuum of legal evidence

competent in a court of law.").
In the hearings held before the Commission,

evidence

was introduced by Mr. Murphy, in the form of a chart which purportedly gives a percentage of the market share held by various
carriers as a function of the number of radio channels held by
those companies.

(R. at 757.)

Mr. Murphy was called not as an

expert, but as a fact witness.

As such he was competent to tes-

tify only as to facts of which he had personal knowledge.
R. Evid. 602.

Utah

Mr. Murphy admitted before the Commission that he

had no personal

knowledge of the percentages and figures con-

tained in the exhibit.

(R. at 52.)

In addition, Mr. Murphy tes-

tified that he did not have any personal knowledge as to which,
if any, of the channels listed in the exhibit were being utilized
by the corresponding service providers.

(R. at 52, 53.)

Because Mr. Murphy's oral and documentary testimony as
to market share and number of channels was based upon facts of
which he had no personal knowledge, his testimony was presented
to the Commission without adequate foundation.

In addition, Mr.

Murphy admitted that his information was obtained from a third
party source.

(R. at 51-52.)

and was inadmissible.

As such, his testimony was hearsay

It was error for the Commission to base
-15-

its findings of fact regarding adequate competition solely upon
Mr. Murphy's testimony,
B.

No Competent Evidence was Presented to the Commis-

sion Upon Which it Could Base its Report and Order or Findings of
Fact.
Utah
things,

that

Code

Ann.

§

the Commission,

telecommunications

service

54-8b-3(2)

requires,

among

in wholly or partially

from

the

requirements

of

other

exempting
Title 54,

make findings of fact "that the telecommunications corporation or
service is subject to a effective competition, [and] that customers of the telecommunications corporation or service have reasonably available alternatives."
witness
regarding

before

the

Commission

competition, market

was Mr. Murphy.

I_d.
for
share

In the case at bar, the only
Mountain

Bell

and available

to

testify

alternatives

Because Mr. Murphy's testimony regarding these

items was admittedly based upon facts as to which he had no personal knowledge, the Commission had no "legally competent evidence" before it upon which it could base its factual findings.
339 P.2d at 1014.

As a result, the Commission's Findings of Fact

were based solely on hearsay evidence, unsupported by a "residuum
of legal evidence competent in a court of law."

-16-

Id.

C«

The Testimony of Division Witnesses Robert Capshaw

and George R. Compton was Based Upon the Hearsay Testimony of Mr.
James H. Murphy.
During cross-examination before the Commission, Division witness Dr. George R. Compton admitted that in formulating
his opinion as to facts presented in the proceeding he had relied
upon documents provided

by Mr. Murphy.

Murphy's

in particular his documentary

testimony, and

As stated

above, Mr.
evidence

regarding market shares was hearsay evidence and cannot be the
sole basis for findings by the Commission.
addition,

Division

witness

Mr.

Robert

(R. at 204.)

Capshaw

admitted

In
on

cross-examination that in preparing his testimony he had before
him the testimony of Mountain Bell, which consisted of the documentary evidence of Mr. Murphy and his prefiled testimony. (R. at
160.)
It is clear from the above admissions that the testimony of both Dr. Compton and Mr. Capshaw before the Commission
was based upon the hearsay testimony of Mr. Murphy.

Therefore,

it cannot be said that the Commission had before it legally competent evidence aside from the hearsay testimony of Mr. Murphy
upon which it could base its Findings of Fact regarding effective
competition
under

and availability

the standard

enunciated

of other carriers.
by this Court,

the

As a result,
Commission's

Findings of Fact were not based upon a residuum of competent evidence and are invalid.
-17-

III. THE COMMISSIONS FINDING OF FACT, NO. 2, 3, 5,
6, 1, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15 AND 16 ARE NOT FACTUALLY SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND ARE ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
In Mountain States Legal Foundation, supra, this Court
stated:
For this Court to sustain an order, the
findings must be sufficiently detailed to
demonstrate that the Commission has properly
arrived at the ultimate factual findings and
has properly applied the governing rules of
law to those findings. Ultimate findings as
to reasonableness and discrimination must be
sustained if there are adequate subordinate
findings to support them, and there is substantial evidence to support the findings.
636 P.2d at 1052.
In the present case, the Commission did not "properly
arrive at [its] ultimate factual findings . . . " and its findings
are not supported by "adequate subordinate findings. . . . "

Id.

Thus, the Commission's Report and Order are invalid as a matter
of law.
In its Report and Order, Commission Finding of Fact No.
2

states

that

"several

types

of

entities

equivalent types of mobile radio service."
added).

offer

functionally

(R. at 573) (emphasis

A central underpinning finding of this paragraph is that

"specialized mobile radio (SMR) providers" offer a "functionally
equivalent" service.

Section 54-8b-3(2)(d) defines a "function-

ally equivalent" service to include those "available at competitive rates, terms, and conditions."
this

Finding

of

Fact

could

be
-18-

The only evidence upon which
premised

is

the

incompetent

testimony of Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy

admitted

that he had no

knowledge of information relating to either the identity of or
the services offered by any SMR offering a service in the State
of Utah.

The findings as to each of the designated areas that

SMR's offer a "functionally equivalent" service are erroneous on
their face.

The record is absolutely barren of any evidence upon

which the necessary further examination could be made to ascertain whether or not such services were "readily available at competitive rates, terms and conditions."
evidence

on

this

record

relating

id.
to

Indeed, there is no

their

rates

and

the

uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that their terms and conditions of service are completely different.

In fact, SMR's are

not even regulated by the Commission.
Similarly, the statement in Finding of Fact No. 3, that
SMR providers in Salt Lake City offer "functionally equivalent"
mobile services is erroneous as a matter of law.

The additional

critical finding made here by the Commission that "NewVector" and
"Salt Lake City Cellular" also offer a "functionally equivalent"
service is without support in the record.

(R. at 525.)

Similarly, Finding of Fact No. 5 (R. at 526) that "in
the Ogden
offered

to

area,
the

functionally
public

equivalent

by Mountain

mobile

radio

Bell, Daniels,

services

Industrial,

NewVector, Salt Lake City Cellular and at least one SMR" is not
supported by the record.

-19-

Each of the Findings of Fact contained in paragraph 6
(R. at 526) is similarly erroneous, not supported by evidence,
and contrary

to the uncontroverted

evidence.

As a matter of

factf Mountain Bell has 100% of the Ogden market.
tive customer base.

It has a cap-

Customers have no competitive

available to them whatsoever.

alternative

Although Industrial has authority

from this Commission to serve this area, it cannot do so competitively because customers in Ogden desiring to call mobile units
in Ogden have to pay a long-distance charge when dealing with
Industrial which is not true with Mountain Bell.
why Mountain Bell has 100% of the market.
competitive at all.

This explains

No other service is

(R. at 241.)

Finding of Fact No. 7 (R. at 641-42) is similarly erroneous.

In the Provo area, Mountain Bell has 100% of the market

because

none of the regulated

characters can offer a complete

service without imposing a long-distance charge.

Thus, Mountain

Bell services a captive customer base with no reasonable alternative service available in the Provo area.
The Findings of Fact contained
642) are erroneous

(R. at 235, 238.)
in paragraph 9 (R. at

in that they find that SMR's

in the Vernal

area offer a "functionally equivalent" service and that mobile
radio services are subject to effective competition in that area.
(R. at 642.)

Industrial is the only arguable competitor of Moun-

tain Bell in the Vernal area.

However, it is uncontroverted that

Mountain Bell has a distinct and unfair competitive advantage in
-20-

Vernal because all of its services are automated and the Industrial competitive

service

is manual.

Industrial could convert

its service to a competitive automated service, but only with the
cooperation of Mountain

Bell, which

to date has been

refused.

(R. at 291-93.)
Similarly, the Findings of Fact set forth in paragraph
10 (R. at 576-77) are wholly unsupported by evidence and contrary
to the uncontroverted evidence with respect to services available
in the Vernal area.

The same is true of the Findings of Fact

contained in paragraph 14 (R. at 577-78) regarding the Moab and
Montecello areas.
Findings of Fact No. 15 (R. at 578) contain numerous
erroneous findings which duplicate those already addressed above.
By way

of

illustration,

but

not

of

exclusion,

we

invite

the

attention of the Court to specific findings set forth in paragraph 15, not heretofore addressed, which are wholly erroneous on
this record as a matter of law:
(a)

The

statement

that

"there

is

no

evidence

that

Mountain Bell has the kind of market power that would allow it to
dictate whatever price it chooses" (R. at 578) is wholly erroneous.

This Finding of Fact is of specific

the second full paragraph of subsection
S

54-8b-3

mandates

the

consideration

importance because

(2) of Utah Code Ann.
of

these

very

factors.

Division witness, Mr. Capshaw conceded on cross-examination that
Mountain Bell and Cellular,

(a sister company) could have the
-21-

staying

power

to set

rates where

they

could

get

rid of

both

Mobile and Industrial and have the entire market to themselves.
(R. at 148.)
(b)

The statements

contained

in paragraph

15

(R. at

578-79) to the effect that no one entity dominates market share
or

has market

power

demonstrated

served are erroneous.

by

the

not

customers

This simply cannot be done

because of the local nature of the markets.
are

of

These statements generalize Mobile radio

service throughout the state of Utah.

statements

number

supported

by

any

(R. at 249.)

evidence

whatsoever

These
with

respect to many of the service areas in the State of Utah where
only a single provider of service is available.
In Finding of Fact No. 15(e) the Commission states that
there is no prohibitive financial burden to entry into the market.

(R. at 579.)

This statement is unsupported by evidence in

the record and is contrary to other uncontroverted evidence contained in the record.

For example, Mr. Capshaw testified that it

would cost tens of thousands of dollars to enter the market in
the local rural areas and that, in his opinion, there will never
be competition in small towns because of the small volume of customers and the difficulty with terrain.
Compton

testified

that

(R. at 142, 152.)

Dr.

it would cost hundreds of thousands of

dollars to enter the marketplace in Salt Lake City.

-22-

(R. at 222.)

Finally, Finding of Fact No. 16 (R. at 581) is in fact
a conclusion of law.

As such, it is erroneous as a matter of

law.
In summary, each of the Findings of Fact listed above
fails to meet the standard enunciated by this court in Mountain
States Legal Foundation and should be vacated by this Court.
CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

set

forth

above,

the

Commission's

Report and Order issued in consolidated case nos. 85-049-09 and
85-999-19 should be vacated.
RESPECTFULLY

submitted

this

$6

""day

of

September,

1987.
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BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -

In the Matter of the Petition
)
Of THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE)
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY for Exemp-)
tion from Regulation of Mobile )
Radio Service and Rural Radio
)
Service.
)

CASE NOS.

85-049-09
85-999-19

REPORT AND ORDER

ISSUED: April 17f 1987
Appearances:
For

Ted D. Smith

The Mountain States
Telephone and Telegraph
Company

m

David Williams, dba
Industrial Communications

Jon C. Heaton

"

Daniels and Associates

Gregory B. Monson

"

U S West NewVector Group,
Inc.

Brian W. Burnett,
Assistant Attorney
General

"

Division of Public
Utilities, Department of
Business Regulation,
State of Utah

Keith E. Taylor

By the Commission:
BACKGROUND
This matter was
Petition
Company

initiated

filed by The Mountain
(Mountain

Bell)

seeking

on August

9,

States Telephone
an

order

1985 by a
& Telegraph

exempting

it from

regulation with regard to Mobile Radio Service and Rural Radio
Service.

The Petition was filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§

54-8b-l et sec.

The docket was assigned Case No* 85-049-09.

Mountain Bell prefiled the direct testimony and exhibits of James

CASE NOS. 85-049-09 and 85-999-19
- 2 H. Murphy at the time the Petition was filed*

On August 19,

1985, NewVector Communications, Inc. filed a Motion to Intervene.
NewVector later changed its name to D S West NewVector Group,
Inc.

(NewVector).

On August 20, 1985, David R. Williams dba

Industrial Communications
vention and Protest.

(Industrial) filed a Notice of Inter-

On August 23, 1985 Mobile Telephone, Inc.

(Mobile) filed a Notice of Intervention and Protest.
later acquired by Daniels and Associates (Daniels) .

Mobile was
In a Pre-

hearing Conference in September, 1985, the Commission concluded
that this matter should be treated as a generic proceeding so
that the deregulation of radio services of other companies in
Utah could be considered.

Therefore, it was assigned Case No.

85-999-19, a generic docket number.
lished for March A,

Hearing dates were estab-

1986, and the Division was ordered to notify

all other providers of rural and mobile radio services in the
State of Utah of the proceeding.
On January 9, 1986, Mountain Bell and the Division
filed a joint motion for a continuance on the ground that Mountain Bell had not completed development and implementation of an
accounting system to separate regulated
vices.

from unregulated ser-

The hearing date was vacated and a further Prehearing

Conference was set for August 5, 1986.
At the Prehearing Conference on August 5, 1986, Mountain Bell indicated that, in light of the fact that its accounting system still had not been fully implemented, it was changing
its request for relief in this matter from full exemption from
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CASE NOS. 85-049-09 and 85-999-19
- 3 all regulation by the Commission to a request that the Commission
merely detariff the rate levels for fixed rural and mobile radio
services.

The Commission concluded that Mountain Bell did not

need to file a new petition since the detariffing of rate levels
was

contemplated

by

the

original

petition.

A

hearing

was

scheduled for November, 1986.
Hearings were held on November 13 and 14, 1986 and on
January 20, 1987.
of Mr. James

Mountain Bell presented the direct testimony

H. Murphy.

The Division presented

the direct,

testimony of Mr. Robert Capshaw and Dr. George Compton.

Indus-

trial presented the testimony of Mr. David Williams.

Daniels

presented evidence by way of proffer which was received without
objection.

Later in the proceeding, Mountain Bell presented

rebuttal testimony by Mr. Larry Fuller and Mr. Murphy.

The

Division

and

presented

additional

testimony

of Mr.

Capshaw

Industrial presented rebuttal testimony of Mr. Williams.

Final

argument was presented to the Commission on January 20, 1986.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This

case

presents

the

first

opportunity

for

the

Commission comprehensively to construe and apply the provisions
of Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-8b-l et. seq., the statute enacted by the
Utah Legislature in 1985, which authorizes us to exempt certain
telecommunication services or companies from regulation.
The issue before us in this proceeding is whether the
record supports the detariffing of rate levels for mobile and
rural radio services.

It is our conclusion that the facts before

CASE NOS. 85-049-09 and 85-999-19
- 4 us support the detariffing of rates for mobile service in the
following cities and their surrounding areas:

Moab, Monticello,

Ogden, Salt Lake City, Provo, Price and Vernal.

The record does

not support the detariffing of rates for rural radio services at
this time.
Section 54-8b-3 of the statutes states:
(1) The commission is vested with power
and jurisdiction to partially or wholly
exempt from any requirement of this title any
telecommunications
corporation
or
public
telecommunications service in this state*
(2) The commission, on its own initiative or in response to an application by a
telecommunications corporation or a user of a
public telecommunications service, may, after
public notice and an opportunity for a
hearing, make findings and issue an order
specifying
its
requirements,
terms,
and
conditions exempting any telecommunications
corporation or any public telecommunications
service from any requirement of this title
either for a specific geographic area or in
the entire state if the Commission finds that
the telecommunications corporation or service
is subject to effective competition, that
customers of the telecommunications corporation or service have reasonably available
alternatives, and that the telecommunications
corporation or service does not serve a
captive customer base, and if such exemption
is in the public interest of the citizens of
the state.
In determining whether to exempt any telecommunications corporation or public telecommunications service from any requirement
of this title, the commission shall consider
all relevant
factors including, but not
limited to:
(a) the number of other providers
offering
similar
services;
(b) the
intrastate market power and market share
within the state of Utah of the telecommunications
corporation
requesting
an
exemption; (c) the intrastate market power and
market share of ether providers; (d) the
existence
of
other
providers
to
make

00051*

CASE NOS. 85-049-09 and 85-999-19
- 5 functionally
equivalent
services readily
available at competitive rates, terms, and
conditions; (e) the effect of exemption on
the regulated revenue requirements of the
telecommunications corporation requesting an
exemption; (f) the ease of entry of other
providers into the marketplace; (g) the
overall impact of exemption on the public
interest; (h) the integrity of all service
providers in the proposed market; (i) the
cost of providing such service; (j) the
economic impact on existing telecommunications corporation; and (k) whether competition will promote the provision of adequate
services at just and reasonable rates.
Subsection

(1) establishes the authority of the Commission to

exempt wholly or in part any requirement of Title 54.

Such

exemption can range from total exemption of every requirement of
Title 54 (in effect, total deregulation of a Company or service)
to exempting specific requirements of the law, in which case the
utility or service will remain subject to all other requirements
of the law.

In this case, we are presented with a petition to

exempt from regulation the requirement to file and gain prior
approval for price levels for mobile and rural radio services.
Even if the Petition is granted, the services will remain subject
to

regulation

as

to

quality,

safety,

facilities, and

other

non-price conditions of service; in the case of telephone corporations (like Mountain Bell) that provide other regulated services, rate base, expenses

and revenues

of mobile

telephone

service will continue to be included in ratemaking.
The telecommunications industry is changing rapidly and
dramatically

through

technological

change as well as through

judicial, administrative, and statutory activity on born a state

nnntr-f n

CASE NOS. 85-049-09 and 85-999-19
- 6 and federal level.

That the Legislature intended the statue to

be a flexible tool is evidenced by Section 54-8b-7:
The commission shall retain continuous
jurisdiction ever every telecommunications
corporation
or public
telecommunications
service exempted under this chapter and may
exercise any statutory grant of power pertaining thereto, including the power to
revoke or modify any order approving an
exemption from regulation. The commission,
may, after notice and hearing, revoke or
modify an order approving exemption, if after
considering
the
factors
in
Subsection'
54-8b-3(2), the commission finds such modification or revocation to be in the public
interest.
(Emphasis added).

Under this section, no exemption order is

final in the sense that the Commission is precluded from revoking
it.

The Commission has the authority to continue to monitor

developments
re-regulate

in

a particular

a service.

market

and,

if necessary,

can

This, as well as the fact that the

Commission can allow exemption subject to "requirements, terms,
and conditions," (§54-8b-3 (2)) is clearly indicative of a legislative intent that the statute be a flexible tool for the Commission to use.
Section 54-8b-3(2) sets forth four findings that the
Commission must make to support an exemption from regulation for
a service:
1.

The service is subject to effective competition;

2.

Customers

of

the

service

have

reasonably

available

alternatives;
3.

The service does not serve a captive customer base; and

4.

Exemption is in the public interest.

000520

CASE NOS. 85-049-09 and 85-999-19
- 7 Each criterion has words that are not otherwise defined.
example:

What is "effective" competition?

available alternative"?

What is a "reasonably

What is a "captive customer base"?

is the definition of the public interest?

For

What

The Commission has

obviously been granted substantial discretion to define these
terms in the context of a particular set of facts.

We do not

intend to attempt to define these terms in the abstract —

by

their nature they cannot be so defined in the absence of specific
facts to test them against.
In addition to the four criteria, Section 54-8b-3(2)
contains additional matters for the Commission's consideration.
The relevant portion states:
In determining whether to exempt any
telecommunications
corporation or public
telecommunications service from any requirement of this title, the commission shall
consider all relevant factors including, but
not limited to:
(a) the number of other
providers offering similar services; (b) the
intrastate market power and market share
within the state of Utah of the telecommunications corporation requesting an exemption; (c) the intrastate market power and
market share of other providers; (d) the
existence of other providers to make functionally equivalent services readily available at competitive rates, terms, and conditions; (e) the effect of exemption on the
regulated revenue requirements of the telecommunications
corporation requesting an
exemption; (f) the ease of entry of other
providers into the marketplace; (g) the
overall impact of exemption on the public
interest; (h) the integrity of all service
providers in the proposed market; (i) the
cost of providing such service; (j) the
economic impact on existing telecommunications corporations; and (k) whether competition will promote the provision of adequate
services at just and reasonable rates.

CASE NOS. 85-049-09 and 85-999-19
- 8 (Emphasis added).
Industrial argued that specific factual evidence must
be presented as to each of the items set forth above and that the
Commission has a duty to make explicit factual findings as to
each.

This is an erroneous reading of the statute.

The statute

makes it clear that the Commission may exempt from regulation if
it "finds" that the four essential criteria are met (i.e. effective competition, reasonably available alternatives, no captive
customer base, exemption is in the public interest).

These are

the only four issues upon which the Commission must make explicit
findings.

The

additional

factors

to be

considered

separate and apart from the four essential criteria.

are not

Indeed, it

is obvious that they are included in the statute as factors that
the Commission is to bear in mind in making its findings and
conclusions as to the four essential criteria.

If the position

advanced by Industrial were correct, then the four essential
criteria would be rendered essentially superfluous.

By expressly

requiring findings as to the four, but merely indicating that the
others shall be considered, the Legislature is indicating its
intent that the latter are to serve as a general guide of relevant questions to examine but is not necessarily indicating that
all of the criteria are necessarily relevant in a given case.
Indeed, the statute indicates that other criteria in a given case
may be relevant.

One thing is completely clear:

the Legisla-

ture is not requiring separate findings as to each of the factors.

000522
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- 9 Furthermore,

examination

of

the

additional

factors

demonstrates that it would be virtually impossible to reduce some
of them to factual testimony or to precise factual conclusions.
Many of them are obviously general policy consideration that
cannot be expressed in precise factual terms.

Thus, while the

Commission needs to bear these factors in mind, there is no legal
requirement to make explicit factual findings as to each.
Industrial and Daniels claim that Mountain Bell failed
to meet its burden of proof for exemption under the statute. The
position of Industrial and Daniels in opposition to detariffing
of rates is based on a reading of Section 54-8b-3 that is much
too restrictive, both in terms of the letter and spirit of the
law.

The only facts Industrial and Daniels apparently believe

should be considered in determining whether to grant an exemption
from regulation are those presented by Mountain Bell.

Even if

this were not a generic proceeding, we would disagree with this
argument.

Proceedings under the statute may be commenced by the

Commission, the Division, a telephone corporation or a consumer.
No matter how the proceedings are commenced, it is the duty of
the Commission to become fully advised so that it may act in the
public interest.

Therefore, we do not regard proceedings under

the statute as placing a burden on any particular party.

This is

even more the case where, as here, we are engaging in a generic
proceeding regarding the possible partial deregulation of all
providers of the service.

Our findings and conclusions may be

based in the totality of the evidence presented to the Commission

CASE NOS. 85-049-09 and 85-999-19
- 10 by all parties, including that presented by the Division, Industrial and Daniels.
Industrial and Daniels attacked at some lengths the
exhibits presented by Mr. Murphy to demonstrate the competitiveness of the marketplace.

Mr. Murphy made it clear that much of

the information in his exhibits was based on published sources
which he, as an experienced manager in the mobile radio marketplace, believed were reliable.
have

personal

knowledge

He acknowledged that he did not

concerning

some

of

the

information.

Industrial and Daniels introduced evidence that certain of the
numbers

in the ' exhibit were

incorrect.

While this evidence

demonstrated inaccuracies in Mr. Murphy's exhibits, it corroborated the intent and thrust of such exhibits.

In its totality,

the evidence in this matter shows that effective competition for
mobile service does exist in the seven

areas set forth above.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.
service

Mobile radio service is a two-way communications

furnished

through

a base

station between

a wireline

telephone and a mobile unit or between two mobile units.
2.

Several

types

of

entities

equivalent types of mobile radio service.
Communication

Carriers

offer

functionally

These include Radio

(RCCs) such as Daniels and Industrial,

Wireline Communications Carriers (WCCs) such as Mountain Bell and
Continental Telephone, Specialized Mobile Radio (SMK) providers,
Cellular Carriers such as NewVector and Salt Lake City Cellular,
as well as owners of private systems.

We note that intrastate
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- 11 cellular telephone service, at least in the Salt Lake SMSA, will
be free of all regulatory restraints as of September of this year
pursuant to Section 54-2-30, Utah Code.
3.

In the Salt Lake City area, functionally equivalent

mobile radio service is offered by Mountain Bell, Industial,
Daniels,
Cellular*

some

SMR

providers, NewVector,

and

Salt

Lake City

In Salt Lake City, Mountain Bell has six radio chan-

nels, Industrial has eleven and Daniels has ten.

While there is

not an exact correlation between radio channels and market share,
there is a general relationship; the more radio channels, the
more traffic that can be served. 1 On a total state basis,
Industrial has 581 mobile customers, Daniels has 234 and Mountain
Bell has 393; the record also shows that on a total state basis,
Industrial has 18 channels, Daniels has 23 and Mountain Bell has
16.

Industrial testified that Mountain Bell's share of the Salt

Lake City area market was 30 to 40 percent.

In addition, the

evidence demonstrated that SMRs have the capability of offering
services equivalent to the mobile services offered by Mountain
Bell, Daniels, and Industrial and that SMRs are operating in the
Salt Lake City area.

The record also shows that Cellular carri-

ers in the Salt Lake City are are in operation and that they are
serving numerous customers,
4.

The facts demonstrate that in the Salt Lake City

a.

Mobile radio services are subject to effective

area:

competition.

CASE NOS. 85-049-09 and 85-999-19
- 12 b.

Customers desiring such services have reasonable

alternatives that are readily available to them.
c.

No

provider

of

such

service

serves

a captive

customer base*
5.

In the Ogden area, functionally equivalent mobile

radio service is offered to the public by Mountain Bell# Daniels,
Industrial, NewVector, Salt Lake City Cellular and at least one
SMR.

While neither Daniels nor Industrial has radio channels in

Ogden, their radio systems provide mobile service in the Ogden
area through their transmitters located in the Oguirrh Mountains.
Both Industrial and Daniels are certificated to serve the Ogden
area and both hold
providing

mobile

themselves

service

in

out through

the

Ogden

advertisements

area.

Through

as

their

tariffs, both Industrial and Daniels are obligated to provide
service to customers requesting such service in the Ogden area.
6.
a.

The facts demonstrate that in the Ogden area:
Mobile radio services are subject to effective

competition.
b.

Customers desiring such services have reasonable

alternatives that are readily available to them.
c.

No

provider

of

such

service

serves

a captive

customer base.
7.

In the Provo area, functionally equivalent mobile

radio service is offered to the public by Mountain Bell, Daniels,
Industrial, and at least one SMR.
Industrial

has

radio

channels

While neither Daniels nor

in Provo, their radio systems
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in the Oquirrh Mountains.

Both

Industrial and

Daniels are certificated to serve the Provo area and both hold
themselves out through advertisements as providing mobile service
in the Provo area.

Through their tariffs, both Industrial and

Daniels are obligated to provide service to customers requesting
such service in the Provo area.

We are also aware that cellular

service will also be offered in Provo in the future.
8.

The facts demonstrate that in the Provo area:

a.

Mobile radio services are subject to effective

competition.
b.

Customers desiring such services have reasonable

alternatives that are readily available to them.
c.

No

provider

of

such

service

serves

a captive

customer base.
9.

In the Vernal area, functionally equivalent mobile

radio service is offered to the public by Mountain Bell, Industrial as well as two SMR providers.

In Vernal, Mountain Bell has

four radio channels and Industrial has seven.
indicated

that the market

The testimony

in Vernal was split fairly evenly

between Industrial and Mountain Bell.
10.
a.

The facts demonstrate that in the Vernal area:
Mobile

radio

services are subject to effective

competition.
b.

Customers desiring such services have reasonable

alternatives that are readily available to them.
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No

provider

of

such

service

serves

a captive

customer base.
11.

In the Price area, functionally equivalent mobile

radio service is offered by Mountain Bell and by Royce's Electronics.

Royce's Electronics is a certificated mobile carrier in

the Price area and holds itself out as providing such services in
that area.
12.
a.

The facts demonstrate that in the Price area:
Mobile

radio

services are subject to effective

competition.
b.

Customers desiring such services have reasonable

alternatives that are readily available to them.
c.

No

provider

of

such

service

serves

a captive

customer base.
13.

In the Moab

and Monticello areas, functionally

equivalent mobile radio service is offered by Continental Telephone and Royce's Electronics.

Both are certificated

mobile

carriers who hold themselves out as providing such services in
those areas.
14.

The

facts

demonstrate

that

in

the

Moab

and

Monticello areas:
a.

Mobile

radio

services are subject to effective

competition.
b.

Customers desiring such services have reasonable

alternatives that are readily available to them.
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No

provider

of

such

service

serves

a captive

customer base.
15.

As to all of the areas above listed, we find that

exempting mobile radio service from the requirements of filing
and gaining prior approval of rate levels is in the public
interest.

In so concluding we note that the facts in the record

demonstrate that:
a.

In each of these market areas, there are at least

two separate entities offering similar services.
b.

In each of these areas, customers and potential

customers can choose between one or more providers.
Even though in the Ogden and Provo areas Industrial and
Mobile claim they have no customers, they also acknowledged that they have not attempted to actively market
in those areas. Nevertheless, they do serve those areas
and are obligated to serve.

In Ogden, cellular service

is provided by NewVector and Salt Lake City Cellular.
Cellular licenses have been granted in the Provo area
to two companies.

There is no evidence that Mountain

Bell has the kind of market power that would allow it
to dictate whatever price it chooses.

In all the other

areas, it was clear that no one entity dominated either
market share or has market power.
number

Just examining the

of mobile customers served by each provider

makes it clear that no one entity has either a dominant
market

share

or market

power.

Mountain

Bell, the
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than Industrial.

Mountain Bell has fewer radio chan-

nels than either Daniels or Industrial.
c.

SMB. providers, RCCs, WCCs, Cellular providers and

private systems all provide mobile radio services that
are functionally equivalent —
nection

to

customers.

the

public

all provide intercon-

switched

network

for mobile

While the rate structures of the various

players in each market vary somewhat, they are generally offered at competitive rates, terms and conditions.
d.

Detariffing

of

rate

levels will

not

adversely

affect the regulated revenue requirements of Mountain
Bell.

Indeed, the purpose of exemption is to allow it

the opportunity to remain viable in the marketplace.
e.

There are no legal barriers of entry to become a

provider of mobile services.
the market without

SMR providers may enter

legal restriction.

Although the

matter is currently on appeal, the FCC recently issued
an order in Docket No. 85-89 reempting state regulation
of entry into the mobile radio marketplace.

Further-

more, we find no prohibitive financial burden to enter
the market.

The recent entry of new providers of such

service demonstrates the ease of market entry.
f.
one.

The mobile radio service market is an expanding
Virtually

all

providers

number of available channels.

are

expanding

their

The facts indicate that
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sound.
g.

As part of our regulatory oversight, we must assure

that the mobile

service of Mountain

Bell or other

carriers is not subsidized by other regulated services.
Mountain

Bell has

services

above

committed

to

direct

costs.

its

provide
As

its mobile
part

of our

regulatory oversight role in the ratemaking process for
Mountain Bell's regulated services, we will, in future
ratemaking

proceedings, assure

commitments

are met.

ourselves

that these

While cost may be a relevant

factor in our ongoing oversight role, we do not believe
it is necessary or relevant that we review specific
cost data to determine whether exemption

should be

allowed, since, as Dr. Compton correctly points out, if
it can be shown that a market is competitive "a regulatory decision to grant pricing flexibility requires
no specific knowledge about the providers' costs."
h.

While

exemption

it

is

will

impossible

have

on

to predict

existing

the effect

suppliers,

it

is

reasonable to believe that detariffing will result in
declining prices.

How this will affect other suppliers

will depend on how each responds in the competitive
marketplace.

We have no reason to believe that detar-

iffing will result in any provider gaining dominance in
the market.

Dr. Compton testified that in his opinion
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Bell will have no incentive

anticompetitive
continuing

pricing

regulatory

to engage in

because of the
oversight

of

Commission's

its

costs

and

revenues in connection with ratemaking and because of
potential liability under the federal antitrust laws,
i.

Detariffing

customers.

will

provide

positive

benefits

to

By explicitly allowing price competition in

the areas set forth above, we believe the result will
be better service at competitive rates.

To the extent

detariffing results in adverse public impacts, we will
not hesitate to consider re-regulation.
16.

Based on all the facts in the record, the Commis-

sion concludes that detariffing of mobile rates in the seven
areas will promote competitive pricing conditions that are just
and reasonable.
17.

Detariffing is therefore in the public interest.

Rural radio service is utilized to provide the

final link of a customer's service by radio link rather than
through wire.
18.
more

closely

service.

Rural radio service, while provided via radio, is
akin to basic

exchange

service

than

to mobile

We are not convinced on the basis of this record that

there is sufficient competition for the provision of such service
and therefore decline to detariff rates for the service at this
time.
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1.

Our

conclusions

regarding

SS

54-8b-l

et

seg.

contained in the General Discussion section of this Report and
Order are hereby incorporated herein by reference.
2.

The

Commission

concludes

that

as

to

Moab,

Monticello, Ogden, Salt Lake Cityf Provo, Price, Vernal and their
surrounding areas, there is effective competition for the provision of mobile telephone service, that customers have reasonably available alternatives, that suppliers do not service
captive customer bases and that detariffing of rates is in the
public interest.
3.

As to rural radio services, the Commission con-

cludes that the service does not meet the requirements of Utah
Code Ann. §54-8b-3(2).
ORDER
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That:
1#

Effective

immediately,

regulated

suppliers

of

mobile telephone service in the following cities and surrounding
areas, may remove rate levels from their tariffs:
Moab
Ogden
Provo
Vernal

Monticello
Salt Lake City
Price

Such suppliers need not seek prior approval of changes in rates
for mobile telephone service.
2.

Rate levels for rural radio service shall continue
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Title 54.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 17th day of April,
1987.

/s/ Brian T« Stewart, Chairman
(SEAL)

I si Brent H. Cameron Commissioner
I si James M. Byrne, Commissioner

Attest:
I si Stephen C. Hewlett, Secretary
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KEITH E. TAYLOR
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioner
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

In the Matter of the Petition
Of THE MOUNTAIN STATES
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH
COMPANY for Exemption from
Regulation of Mobile Radio
Service and Rural Radio Service

Case Nos. 85-049-09;
85-999-19
PETITION FOR REVIEW
AND REHEARING

* * * * * * * *

David

R.

Williams,

dba

Industrial

Communications

("Industrial"), intervenor and protestant in the above-entitled
matter respectfully petitions the Commission to review, rehear,
and upon review and rehearing, to reverse the Report and Order
issued

in

the

above-entitled

matter

dated

April

17, 1987.

Petitioner asserts that this Petition should be granted because
the Report and Order is erroneous as a matter of law for the
following reasons:
1.

The Commission misinterpreted and misapplied the

provisions of Utah Code Annotated S 54-8(b)-3.
2.

The Commission erred at hearing by receiving in

evidence written testimony, oral testimony and exhibits sponsored
by James H. Murphy, by refusing to strike the same and by basing
findings of fact thereon.

00053*7

3.

Findings of Fact set forth in the Report and Order

numbered 2,3,5,6,7,8,9,10,14,15 and 16 are not supported by the
record and are erroneous as a matter of law.
4.
section of

Conclusions
the Report

stated

by

and Order

the

titled

Commission

in

the

"General Discussion"

together with Conclusions of Law numbered 1 and 2 are erroneous
as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
I.

THE COMMISSION MISINTERPRETED AND
MISAPPLIED THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED S 54-8(b)-3

Utah Code Annotated S 54-8(b)-3 provides in the first
full paragraph of subsection (2) that an order issued by the
Commission
supported

under
by

the

four

power

vested

specifically

by

the

designated

statute
findings

must
of

be

fact.

After so providing, subsection (2) then states that in making
those findings the Commission must consider all relevant factors.
"Relevant factors" are defined in that paragraph to include, but
not to be limited to, specifically designed factors, some of
which

were

ignored

completely

by

the

Commission

in

this

proceeding because no evidence was produced regarding the same by
the Commission

itself or any party to the proceeding.

That

paragraph reads as follows:
In determining
communications
communications
of this title,

whether to exempt any telecorporation or public teleservice from any requirement
the commission shall consider

-2-

000538

all relevant
factors
including, but not
limited
to:
(a) the number of other
providers offering similar services; (b) the
intrastate market power and market share
within the state of Utah of the telecommunications
corporation
requesting
an
exemption;
(c) the intrastate market power
and market share of other providers; (d) the
existence of other providers to make functionally equivalent services readily available
at competitive rates, terms, and conditions;
(e) the effect of exemption on the regulated
revenue
requirements
of
the
telecommunications corporation requesting an exemption;
(f) the ease of entry of other providers into
the marketplace;
(g) the overall impact of
exemption on the public interest;
(h) the
integrity of all service providers in the
proposed market;
(i) the cost of providing
such service;
(j) the economic impact on
existing telecommunications corporation; and
(k) whether competition will promote the
provision of adequate services at just and
reasonable rates. (Emphasis added).
At pp. 8 and 9 of the Report and Order the Commission
badly

misconstrues

the

interpretation

of

S 54-8(b)-3 which was urged by Williams

Utah

Code

Annotated

at the hearing.

The

position of Williams was and is that the four findings designated
in the first full paragraph of subsection (2) of this statute are
mandatory;

that no specific findings need be made with regard to

defined "relevant

factors" numbered

(a) through

(k);

but that

the Commission must consider each of those enumerated factors in
making the required findings of fact.
so states.

It follows that

The statute specifically

if neither the Commission

nor any

party to the proceedings offers any evidence whatsoever regarding

-3-

000539

one or more of those "relevant

factors," and the Commission,

nonetheless, purports to enter an order pursuant to the authority
granted by the statute, it will not act in conformance with the
provisions of the statute.

It did not so act here.

Illustrative of the Commission's

error

is "relevant

factor" (i) "the cost of providing such service."

That factor,

in addition

to being

defined

by

the statute

as

a

required

"relevant factor", is of particular importance here because the
applicant

(Mtn. Bell) seeks to remove from regulation by the

Commission its pricing of this service.

The operating witness

which it sponsored at the hearing admitted that Mtn. Bell had
available cost studies and could have produced

and presented

evidence of its cost of service but refrained from doing so and
refused to answer questions on this subject.

(TR. 41, 97-8)

Instead of requiring evidence of applicant's "cost of
services" so that this "relevant factor" could be considered in
making its necessary findings of fact, the Commission determined
that this particular factor was not "relevant" in this case.

At

page 17 of the Report and Order the Commission stated that in
this case cost is neither "necessary" nor "relevant".

In so

holding, the Commission relied upon the testimony of Dr. Compton
who

stated

that

"a

regulatory

decision

to

grant

pricing

flexibility requires no specific knowledge about the provider's
cost."

With all due

respect

to Dr. Compton's

opinion, and
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without arguing whether or not his opinion has any merit, suffice
it to say that both he and the Commission have substituted their
wisdom for that of the Utah Legislature.

The Legislature has

mandated a consideration of this factor.
The Commission

likewise, and we assume

for similar

reasons, failed to give due consideration to "relevant factors"
numbered (b),(c),(d),(e),(g),(j) and (k).

These errors require

review, rehearing and reversal.
II.

THE COMMISSION ERRED AT HEARING BY RECEIVING
IN EVIDENCE WRITTEN TESTIMONY, ORAL TESTIMONY
AND EXHIBITS SPONSORED BY JAMES H. MURPHY, BY
REFUSING TO STRIKE THE SAME AND BY BASING
FINDS OF FACT THEREON

The applicant at hearing sponsored written testimony,
oral testimony and exhibits through its operating witness James
H. Murphy.

To the extent that such "evidence" is material to any

of the issues in this proceeding, it is almost wholly comprised
of

inadmissible

speculation

and

conclusions

without

any

foundation whatsoever or based upon various types of hearsay.
The Commission overruled appropriate objections to this testimony
and denied motions to strike the same.

(TR. 21,58,61-3,94,117)

Nonetheless, it premised critical and necessary findings thereon.
Commissioner Cameron stated as follows with respect to
the "hearsay" aspect of Mr. Murphy's testimony:
"Hearsay

evidence

is

admissible

in

Utah

in

(TR. 29-30)
administrative

-5-
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hearings.

It cannot be relied on solely for a finding of fact or

conclusion by the Commission11.
We do not argue with this statement.
Murphy's

"hearsay"

Commission's

is

findings

"solely"
and

the

basis

However, Mr.

of

conclusions.

some

And,

of

even

the
more

troublesome, some of the Commission's findings and conclusions
are based upon Murphy's pure speculations and conclusions which
were, admittedly, lacking

in any foundation whatsoever.

They

were not even supported by "hearsay" material but were plucked
from the air.

By way of example, but not of limitation, Mr.

Murphy speculated and concluded that SMRs provided functionally
equivalent

mobile

telephone

applicant and by Williams.
because the legislature

service

to

that

offered

by

the

This factual information is critical

in its wisdom has mandated

that the

commission "shall" consider, among other things, before issuing
an order under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated S 54-8(b)-l,
as

one

of

providers

the
to

"relevant

make

factors"

functionally

the

"existence

equivalent

of

services

other
readily

available at competitive rates, terms and conditions" (emphasis
added).
Despite the fact that Mr. Murphy conceded on cross
examination that he was not familiar with a single SMR in Utah or
the

services

erroneously

which

accepted

it

provided

and

relied

(TR.
upon

32),
his

the

Commission

conclusions

as to
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functional
liberty

equivalency

to

unfounded

premise

of

services.

findings

speculation

it

of

may

as

If

the Commission

fact

upon

well

such

dispense

is at

completely

with

hearings

altogether because they become absolutely meaningless.
We respectfully submit that the commission erred as a
matter of law by receiving such speculation in the first place,
by

refusing

to

strike

the

same

from

the

record

relying upon the same to underpin critical

fact

and

then

by

considerations

and findings required by the legislature.
III. FINDINGS OF FACT SET FORTH IN THE REPORT
AND ORDER NUMBERED 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 14, 15 AND 16 ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY
THE RECORD AND ARE ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER
OF LAW
In making its "Findings of Fact", the Commission went
beyond the statutory mandated four specific findings.
it

is

important

to

review

those

findings

which

it

However,
did

make

because they obviously underpin the ultimate conclusions reached
by the Commission in its Report and Order.
1.

We first invite the attention of the Commission to

Finding of Fact

number

2 at pages ten and eleven.

The

first

sentence of that Finding reads "several types of entities offer
functionally

equivalent

(emphasis

added).

paragraph

is

that

A

types

of

central

"specialized

mobile

radio

underpending

finding

mobile

(SMR)

radio

service",
of

this

providers"
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offer

a

"functionally

equivalent"

service.

Functionally

equivalent service as specifically defined by statute.

In the

second full paragraph of Utah Code Annotated S 54-8(b)-3 (2) this
term

is

defined

as

a

service

which

is

at

"functionally

equivalent" and "readily available at competitive ratesr terms,
and conditions,"

It is respectfully submitted that the only

"evidence" upon which this "Finding of Fact" could be premised is
the diseased testimony of Mr. Murphy which is addressed above and
which

could

not

possible

underpin

such

a

finding.

Murphy

admittedly had ITO knowledge or information relating to either the
identity of or the services offered by any SMR offering a service
in Utah!

The findings as to each of the designated areas that

SMRs offer a "functionally equivalent service" are erroneous on
their face.
which

the

The record is absolutely barren of any evidence upon
necessary

further

examination

could

be

made

to

ascertain whether or not such services were "readily available at
competitive rates, terms and conditions."
evidence

on

this

uncontroverted

record

evidence

relating

to

demonstrates

Indeed, there is no
their

that

rates

their

conditions of service are completely different.

and

the

terms

and

In fact, none of

those SMRs is even regulated by this Commission.
Dr. Compton addressed this subject
He

stated

(controverted

only

by

Murphy's

in his testimony.
bootstrapped

and

unsupported speculations) that "SMRs may or may not be effective
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competition depending upon how open they are".

(TR. 169)

Mr.

Burnett, counsel who sponsored Division witnesses Capshaw and
Compton admitted, in response to specific inquiry by Commissioner
Cameron as to whether or not SMRs are "effective competition"
stated:

(TR. 170)
MR. BURNETT:

Well, I think what Mr. Capshaw said is

you need to make an evaluation of that but absent that evaluation
which we didn't feel like we had in this proceeding, particularly
for each individual town or municipality or area, we did know as
a matter of record or as a matter of personal knowledge that we
had more than one regulated carrier in each of these towns, but
if you were going
perhaps

you

had

to make an analysis
a

—

some

in other

competition

towns where

between

SMR's

or

competition between an SMR and an RCC that evaluation hasn't been,
made.
COM.
recommendaiton
MR.

CAMERON:

So

the

Division

is

not

making

a

SMR's

as

—
BURNETT:

—

that

we

should

include

competition; is that —
MR.

BURNETT:

Well,

I think

that

would

require a

further proceeding.
2.

Similarly, the statement in Finding of Fact number

3, that SMR providers

in Salt

Lake City offer

"functionally

equivalent" mobile services is erroneous as a matter of law.

The

additional critical finding made here by the Commission that "New
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Vector" and "Salt Lake City Cellular" also offer a "functionally
equivalent"

service

is

without

support

in

the

evidence.

Admittedly, Salt Lake City Cellular had not even entered the
market and offered no services at all at the date of the hearing.
(TR

60)

Under

the

applicable

statute,

to be

"functionally

equivalent", the service must "readily available at competitive
rates, terms and conditions".

Under this test, the kind of

service offered to the public by New Vector is not "functionally
equivalent" because costs are from 600 to 700 percent more than
for IMTS service now offered by the regulated carriers.

This

type of service has some advantages and some disadvantages to the
presently

available

regulated

"functionally equivalent".
3.

service,

but

certainly

is not

(TR. 246)

Findings in Finding of Fact number 5 at page 12

that SMRs, New Vector and Salt Lake Cellular offer "functionally
equivalent mobile radio service" is similarly erroneous.
4.

Each of the specific Findings of Fact contained in

paragraph 6 at page 12 is similarly erroneous, not supported by
evidence, and contrary to the uncontroverted

evidence.

matter of fact, Mtn. Bell has 100% of the Ogden market.
captive customer base.
available

for

them

As a

It has a

Customers have no competitive alternative
whatsoever.

Although,

Industrial

has

authority from this Commission to service the area, it cannot do
so competitively

because customers

in Ogden desiring

to call
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mobile units in Ogden have to pay a long distance charge when
dealing with industrial which is not true with Mtn. Bell.
explains why Mtn* Bell has 100% of the market.

This

No other service

is competitive at all (TR. 241).
5.

Findings

similarly erroneous.

of

Fact

number

7

at

pages

12-13

is

In the Provo area, Mtn. Bell has 100% of

the market because none of the regulated carriers can offer a
complete service without imposing a long distance charge.
Bell

services

alternative

a

captive

service

customer

is available

base
to

where

them

no

which

Mtn.

reasonable
is

"readily

available at competitive rates, terms and conditions".

(TR.

235r 238)
6.
page

13

The Findings of Fact contained in paragraph 8 at

similarly

are

totally

erroneous

regarding

service

available in the Provo area.
7.

The Findings of Fact contained in paragraph 9 at

pages 13 and 14 are erroneous in that they find that SMRs in the
Vernal area offer a "functionally equivalent" service and that
mobile radio services are subject to effective competition in
that area.

Industrial is the only arguable competitor of Mtn.

Bell in the Vernal area.

However, it is uncontroverted that Mtn.

Bell has a distinct and unfair competitive advantage in Vernal
because all of

its services are automated and the industrial

4

competitive

service

is manual.

Industrial

could convert

its
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service to a competitive automated service, but only with the
cooperation with Mtn. Bellf which to the date of hearing it has
refused to give.
8.
paragraph

(TR. 291-3)

Similarly,

10

at pages

the
13

Findings

and

14

of

Fact

are wholly

set

forth

in

unsupported

by

evidence and contrary to the uncontroverted evidence with respect
to services available in the Vernal area.
9.

Similarly,

the

Findings

of

Fact

set

forth

in

paragraph 14 at pages 14 and 15 are not supported by evidence and
are contrary to uncontroverted evidence of record.
10.
numerous

Findings of Fact number 15 at pages 15-18 contain

erroneous

addressed above.

findings

which

duplicate

those

already

By way of illustration, but not of exclusion,

we invite the attention to the Commission of specific findings
set forth in this paragraph, not heretofore addressed, and which
are wholly erroneous on this record on a matter of laws
(a)

Statement at page 15 that "there is no evidence

that Mountain Bell has the kind of market power that would allow
it to dictate whatever price it chooses1'.
finding

is

of

specific

importance

This wholly erroneous

because

the

second

full

paragraph of subsection (2) of Utah Code Annotated § 54-8(b)-3
mandates the consideration of these very factors.

Applicants own

operating witness admitted that "the resources are there" and the
"ability is there" for Mtn. Bell to dictate whatever price it
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chooses and to drive the competition right out of business.

In

addition, Mr. Kapshaw conceded on cross examination that Mtn.
Bell and Cellular, (a sister company) could have the staying
power to set rates where they could get rid of both Mobile and
Industrial and have the entire market to themselves.
(b)

Statements

contained

in

the

(TR. 148)

last

two

full

sentences at page 15 to the effect that no one entity dominated
market share or has market power demonstrated by the number of
customers served by each provider.

These statements generalize

Mobile Radio Service throughout the state of Utah.

This simply

cannot

the markets

be done

(TR. 249).

because

of

This statement

the

local

nature of

is not supported by any evidence

whatsoever with respect to many of the service areas in the state
of Utah where a single provider of service is available (see
e.g. , Wendover, Utah

where Mtn. Bell

is the only

supplier)

(TR. 43). (See also the Ogden and Provo areas where Mtn. Bell has
100 percent of the market.)
(c) At page 16 the Commission states that the FCC in
Docket No. 8589 preempts state regulation.

In point of fact,

that ruling has been reversed by the federal court.
(d) At page 16 in the last full paragraph of paragraph
designated e., the Commission states there
financial
unsupported

burden
by

to

enter

evidence

the
of

market.
record

is no prohibitive
This

and

is

statement

is

contrary

to
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uncontroverted

evidence of

testified that

it would cost tens of thousands of dollars to

enter the market

record.

in the local

For example, Mr. Capshaw

rural areas and that,

in his

opinion, there will never be competition in small towns because
of the small volume of customers and the difficulty with terrain
(TR. 142, 152).

Dr. Compton

testified

that

it would

cost

hundreds of thousands of dollars to enter the market place in
Salt Lake City
11.

(TR. 222).
Finding of Fact number 16 at page 18 is in fact a

Conclusion of Law.
IV.

As such it is erroneous as a matter of law.

THE CONCLUSIONS STATED BY THE
COMMISSION IN THE SECTION OF THE REPORT
AND ORDER TITLED "GENERAL DISCUSSION"
TOGETHER WITH CONCLUSION OF LAW NO. 1
AND 2 ARE ERRONEOUS AS A MATTER OF LAW.

These conclusions of law, coupled with those stated in
Findings of Fact number 16 at page 18, are erroneous as a matter
of law because of the erroneous fact findings that underpin them
and because of the misconstruction

and misapplication of the

applicable statute by the Commission discussed above.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Commission should
review the report and order in this matter and grant a rehearing
therein.
aside

in

Following review and rehearing, the order should be set
its entirety

and

the

application

of Mtn. Bell for

relief, together with the related generic proceeding, should be
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dismissed.

As noted above, the Commission has failed to give

consideration

to

factors

mandated

for

consideration

by

the

Legislature.

It has not produced evidence itself, nor has it

required other parties of record to produce evidence, regarding
factors which must be reviewed to underpin an affirmative order
under the applicable statute.

The Commission has made specific

findings of fact which underpin its Report and Order which are
completely

unsupported

by evidence and which

are contrary to

uncontroverted evidence of record.
It follows that the report and order on file herein
should be reviewed and withdrawn.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this S&

day of May, 1987.

KEI*H>E. TA^LOtf
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for David R. Williams
dba Industrial Communications

-15-

000551

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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thereof to the following this 5th day of May, 1987:
Gregory B. Monson, Esq.
Watkiss & Campbell
310 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Jon C. Heaton
Princes, Yeates & Geldzahler
Third Floor Mony Plaza
424 East 500 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Ted D. Smith
General Attorney
250 Bell Plaza, Room 1610
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Brian W. Burnett, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114
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APPENDIX "C"
54-8B-3. Commission jurisdiction over telecommunications - Exemptions from title
allowed - Hearings and findings - Approval
period.
(1) The commission is vested with power and
jurisdiction to partially or wholly exempt
from any requirement of this title any telecommunications corporation or public telecommunications service in this state.
(2) The commission, on its own initiative or
in response to an application by a telecommunications corporation or a user of a public
telecommunications service, may, after public
notice and an opportunity for a hearing, make
findings and issue an order specifying its
requirements, terms, and conditions exempting
any telecommunications corporation or any
public telecommunications service from any
requirement of this title either for a specific geographic area or in the entire state
if the commission finds that the telecommunications corporation or service is subject to
effective competition, that customers of the
telecommunications corporation or service
have reasonably available alternatives, and
that the telecommunications corporation or
service does not serve a captive customer
base, and if such exemption is in the public
interest of the citizens of the state. In
determining whether to exempt any telecommunications corporation or public telecommunications service from any requirement of this
title, the commission shall consider all relevant factors including, but not limited to:
(a) the number of other providers offering
similar services; (b) the intrastate market
power and market share within the state of
Utah of the telecommunications corporation
requesting an exemption; (c) the intrastate
market power and market share of other providers; (d) the existence of other providers
to make functionally equivalent services
readily available at competitive rates,
-27-

termsf and conditions; (e) the effect of
exemption on the regulated revenue requirements of the telecommunications corporation
requesting an exemption; (f) the ease of
entry of other providers into the marketplace; (g) the overall impact of exemption on
the public interest; (h) the integrity of all
service providers in the proposed market;
(i) the cost of providing such service;
(j) the economic impact on existing telecommunications corporations; and (k) whether
competition will promote the provision of
adequate services at just and reasonable
rates.
(3) The commission shall approve or deny any
application for exemption under this section
within 240 days, except that the commission
may by order defer action for an additional
30-day period.
If the commission has not
acted on any application within the permitted
time period, the application shall be deemed
granted.
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